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Pro se litigants face a number of challenges when bringing civil litigation. One 
potential solution to these challenges, endorsed by members of the judiciary and the 
legal academy, is pro se reform at the trial court level: offering special services to pro 
se litigants in order to help them successfully navigate the legal system. This  
Comment offers the first publicly available empirical assessment of several pro se 
reform efforts thus far. The analysis shows that these pro se reforms have not suc-
ceeded in improving pro se litigants’ win rates at trial. This Comment thus suggests 
that, while pro se reforms likely have important merits, such as enabling a more 
thorough and dignified hearing process for pro se litigants, on average these reforms 
do not alter the final outcomes of the litigation process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, Judge Richard Posner abruptly resigned 
from the Seventh Circuit. In subsequent interviews, Posner ex-
plained that he resigned in part because of his disagreement with 
his judicial colleagues over the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of pro 
se litigants (those litigants who appear before courts without law-
yers).1 In particular, Posner thought the court wasn’t “treating 
the pro se appellants fairly,” didn’t “like the pro se’s,” and gener-
ally didn’t “want to do anything with them.”2 
Posner’s resignation is a powerful reminder of the challenges 
pro se litigants continue to face. His belief that pro se litigants 
are frequently mistreated in civil litigation and denied a full and 
fair opportunity to vindicate their claims is neither new nor lim-
ited to federal appellate courts.3 Numerous legal commentators 
have expressed similar concerns.4 Yet, though the belief that pro 
se litigants are underserved by the legal community is wide-
spread, the full extent of the challenges they face in court is still 
only partially understood. 
At the same time, there has been considerable consternation 
over the growing volume of judicial and legal resources consumed 
 
 1 See David Lat, The Backstory behind Judge Richard Posner’s Retirement (Above 
the Law, Sept 7, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/AW74-5TQ6. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Many commentators share the same concerns about indigent criminal defendants. 
However, because criminal defendants are guaranteed access to counsel, they face a some-
what different set of challenges than pro se civil litigants and are not the focus of the 
analysis of this Comment. For one critical discussion of the treatment of indigent criminal 
defendants, see generally Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: Can Soci-
ety Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 Mo L Rev 683 (2010). But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 
In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 Vand L Rev 1099, 1127–29 (2014) (arguing 
that representation of criminal indigent defendants is generally of high quality). 
 4 See generally, for example, Donald H. Zeigler and Michele G. Hermann, The In-
visible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 NYU L Rev 157 
(1972) (highlighting problems and difficulties for pro se litigants throughout the litigation 
process); Thomas L. Eovaldi and Peter R. Meyers, The Pro Se Small Claims Court in  
Chicago: Justice for the “Little Guy”?, 72 Nw U L Rev 947 (1978) (discussing deficiencies 
of pro se small claims courts). See also Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro 
Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law 
School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 Fordham L Rev 1879, 1926 (1999) (describing the pro 
se system as one that “sacrifices justice for expediency”). 
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by pro se litigants.5 Many pro se litigants bring dubious claims.6 
Time and energy expended on these claims is time and energy 
that cannot be expended on other legal issues. 
Any reform must simultaneously balance a number of key 
policy goals: it should ensure the ability of pro se litigants to re-
ceive fair trials without unfairly disadvantaging their adver-
saries, allocate sufficient resources to ensure quick and fair hear-
ings while avoiding overdrawing on judicial and legal resources 
that might instead be put to more urgent needs,7 and be practica-
ble within the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence and the 
statutory authority granted to courts by Congress. 
A number of commentators have trumpeted reforms at the 
trial court level geared toward assisting pro se litigants as a pos-
sible solution.8 These reforms usually aim to give pro se litigants 
access to resources and information that can help them success-
fully navigate the legal process, reduce their costs, or provide 
them with assistance from courts’ offices.9 Examples of reforms 
that have been implemented include providing pro se litigants 
with access to electronic filing systems that make it easier to file 
lawsuits and monitor proceedings, allowing pro se litigants to 
communicate with law clerks about their claims and proceedings, 
 
 5 See generally, for example, Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State 
Bar Association, Pro Se Litigation in the Second Circuit, 62 St John’s L Rev 571 (1988) 
(suggesting solutions to combat an exploding pro se docket); Benjamin H. Barton and 
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 
U Pa L Rev 967 (2012) (arguing that there are more cost-efficient approaches to improving 
pro se litigation than a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases because of the consid-
erable resources that it would require). 
 6 The Supreme Court has indicated awareness of this issue. See Neitzke v Williams, 
490 US 319, 326 (1989) (noting “the problems in judicial administration caused by the 
surfeit of meritless in forma pauperis complaints in the federal courts, not the least of 
which is the possibility that meritorious complaints will receive inadequate attention or 
be difficult to identify amidst the overwhelming number of meritless complaints”). 
 7 At least some commentators have expressed concern that allocating more legal 
resources to pro se civil litigants might take away from resources needed for indigent crim-
inal defense. See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 980–81 (cited in note 5). It is im-
portant, however, to recognize that legal resources also may trade off with nonlegal re-
sources, and an analysis accounting for these trade-offs may make the economics of 
expanded legal resources for pro se litigants look more attractive. Additional money spent 
on lawyers or pro se assistance might be more economical than it first appears if, for ex-
ample, additional state spending in an eviction or wrongful termination proceeding saves 
the government from paying for homeless shelters or welfare assistance at a later date. 
 8 See, for example, note 60 and accompanying text. 
 9 See generally Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s 
Court, 47 Conn L Rev 741 (2015) (arguing for “demand side” procedural and judicial reform 
to assist pro se litigants as opposed to the “supply side” reform of simply providing counsel 
to pro se litigants); Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev 967 (cited in note 5). 
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and publicly disseminating information about resources that may 
be available to pro se litigants through the court or third parties.10 
Critically, these reforms can be implemented by the trial courts 
and their staff and do not require significant additional contribu-
tions from attorneys, clinics, or other legal institutions. Accord-
ingly, these programs can help pro se litigants without diverting 
legal resources away from other causes, including indigent crim-
inal defense. A large number of federal district courts have al-
ready implemented at least some of these procedural reforms 
aimed at helping pro se litigants.11 
This Comment furthers the legal community’s understanding 
of issues in pro se litigation by conducting an empirical analysis 
of pro se reforms in federal district courts. By comparing case out-
comes for pro se litigants in district courts that have implemented 
these types of reforms with the outcomes of similarly situated pro 
se litigants in courts that have not implemented any reforms, this 
Comment provides an initial assessment of the impact of those 
reforms. The analysis reveals that thus far, a wide range of re-
forms undertaken by federal district courts have not significantly 
impacted case outcomes for pro se litigants. This analysis con-
flicts with the intuitions of the Supreme Court, commentators, 
and judges and clerks of district court offices, who have indicated 
their belief that these reforms are effective. 
Importantly, this Comment does not suggest that these re-
forms have been failures. These reforms may have improved the 
pro se litigation process by making it feel more humane and eas-
ier to understand and by giving litigants a stronger sense that 
their concerns have been heard. Moreover, these reforms may still 
ease the burden of pro se litigation on courts by helping courts 
understand the issues involved more clearly or by moving cases 
through the judicial system more quickly. The analysis does sug-
gest, however, that district court reforms have been ineffective in 
improving case outcomes for pro se litigants, and alternative ap-
proaches should be considered. 
Accordingly, this Comment suggests that pro se trial court 
reform is not the silver bullet that some commentators have 
hoped for in the quest to remedy the shortcomings of the pro se 
 
 10 For more discussion, see Part I.C. 
 11 See Donna Stienstra, Jared Bataillon, and Jason A. Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se 
Litigants in U.S. District Courts: A Report on Surveys of Clerks of Court and Chief Judges 
*3 (Federal Judicial Center, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8TYT-7Y43 (reporting that 
90 percent of the US district courts surveyed have adopted at least one procedural reform). 
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litigation process. In order to meaningfully improve case out-
comes for pro se litigants, the legal community will either need to 
implement different and potentially more dramatic reforms than 
those implemented thus far or consider another approach alto-
gether, such as renewed advocacy for “civil Gideon.”12 Alterna-
tively, it is also possible that there is no cost-effective way to im-
prove case outcomes for civil pro se litigants in the context of the 
modern US legal system. This Comment does not analyze the 
merits of these options. Instead, it strongly suggests that a differ-
ent solution is needed to ensure pro se litigants get a full and 
equal opportunity to have their claims redressed via litigation. 
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides an intro-
duction to relevant case law, as well as key perspectives in the 
academy, on the rights of pro se litigants and procedural safe-
guards to protect pro se litigants. Part II presents an empirical 
overview of pro se litigation in federal district courts and contex-
tualizes the typical types and outcomes of pro se litigation within 
the context of the federal docket. Part III details some of the pol-
icies that federal district courts have implemented thus far to im-
prove the results of pro se litigation by comparing pro se outcomes 
in courts that have implemented those reforms with pro se out-
comes in courts that have not implemented those reforms, and it 
demonstrates that those measures have not impacted case out-
comes. Part IV then describes and analyzes the effects of whole-
sale reforms to the pro se litigation process in the Eastern District 
of New York (EDNY) by comparing case outcomes for pro se liti-
gants in EDNY with those of neighboring districts before and af-
ter the implementation of reforms. Part IV bolsters the findings 
of Part III by showing that EDNY’s wholesale pro se reform also 
did not impact the win rates of pro se litigants. Part V discusses 
some of the implications of the results detailed in Parts III and 
IV, and the Conclusion summarizes the contribution of this  
Comment and identifies some opportunities for future research. 
I.  THE RIGHTS OF CIVIL PRO SE LITIGANTS 
There is limited Supreme Court jurisprudence on trial-court 
reforms for civil pro se litigants. However, an extensive body of 
 
 12 Civil Gideon refers generally to the movement to provide legal counsel to low- 
income persons in various civil legal proceedings. For more discussion about the contours 
of this movement, see Part I.B. 
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case law establishes the right to counsel for indigent criminal lit-
igants and then denies that right to civil litigants who cannot af-
ford counsel. Moreover, in one recent case, Turner v Rogers,13 the 
Supreme Court established a limited right to procedural protec-
tions for civil pro se litigants, creating the potential for new juris-
prudence establishing new rights for civil pro se litigants.14 
A. Case Law on the Rights of Pro Se Litigants at Trial 
Over the past hundred years, unrepresented litigants have 
brought numerous lawsuits to determine the extent to which the 
Constitution guarantees the right to counsel, mostly focusing on 
the textual guarantees in the Sixth and Fourteenth  
Amendments.15 The Sixth Amendment famously states that, “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”16 The Supreme Court 
has clarified the scope of the right to counsel in criminal prosecu-
tions through a series of landmark cases, gradually converting a 
guaranteed right to provide one’s own counsel into a right to  
government-provided counsel whenever a criminal defendant is 
unable to procure counsel.17 However, the Supreme Court has 
taken a much narrower view of the right to counsel, and legal pro-
tections more generally, for pro se litigants in civil cases.18 
From the 1930s through the 1970s, the Supreme Court grad-
ually strengthened the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions 
in a series of landmark decisions. Ultimately, this led to the  
Supreme Court’s current position: defendants have the right to 
counsel in essentially all criminal prosecutions.19 The first key 
 
 13 564 US 431 (2011). 
 14 See notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
 15 “Right to counsel” in this Comment refers to a litigant’s right to have an attorney 
provided if the litigant is unable to afford a lawyer. In other contexts, it is sometimes 
defined more narrowly, such as a right to a lawyer only in the case of criminal defense or 
a right to a lawyer only if a litigant can afford his or her own lawyer. See generally, Note, 
The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 Yale L J 545 (1967). 
 16 US Const Amend VI. 
 17 See John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel,  
48 Harv CR–CL L Rev 1, 6–15 (2013) (discussing the historic evolution of the Sixth  
Amendment right to counsel). 
 18 See, for example, Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 789 (1973) (discussing how 
differences between criminal trials and civil proceedings, such as lack of a state prosecutor 
and less formal procedure, eliminate the need for a categorical guarantee of a right to 
counsel for defendants in some civil proceedings even when a loss might lead to their 
incarceration). 
 19 See Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25, 40 (1972) (holding that, “[u]nder the rule 
we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no 
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case in this series was Powell v Alabama.20 In Powell, the  
Supreme Court held for the first time that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to respect the right 
to counsel in at least some criminal trials.21 Under Powell, the 
right to adequate counsel was guaranteed only for capital cases. 
The Court explicitly declined to reach the question of whether 
states needed to provide a similar guarantee of access to counsel 
in noncapital cases.22 
Over the next thirty years, the Supreme Court slowly ex-
panded the right to counsel for criminal defendants. Shortly after 
Powell, in Johnson v Zerbst,23 the Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment protects the right to counsel for all criminal 
defendants in federal courts.24 Additionally, the Court held that, 
when the accused “is not represented by counsel and has not com-
petently and intelligently waived his constitutional right” to 
counsel, any criminal conviction will be ruled unconstitutional as 
a Sixth Amendment violation.25 The Supreme Court initially de-
clined to extend Zerbst to all criminal cases in state courts, in-
stead reaffirming, as it held in Powell, that the right to counsel 
was guaranteed only in capital cases in state courts. In Betts v 
Brady,26 the Court declined to overturn a robbery conviction even 
though the trial court had refused the defendant’s request for the 
assistance of counsel, holding that states were not constitution-
ally mandated to provide adequate counsel for state trials in non-
capital cases.27 
In 1963, the Supreme Court broke from precedent and found 
the right to counsel to be a “fundamental safeguard[ ] of liberty” 
 
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is 
represented by counsel”). 
 20 287 US 45 (1932). 
 21 Id at 56–61.  
 22 See id at 71: 
Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circum-
stances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do 
decide, is that in a capital case . . . it is the duty of the court, whether requested 
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law. 
 23 304 US 458 (1938). 
 24 Id at 463. 
 25 Id at 468. 
 26 316 US 455 (1942). 
 27 Id at 473 (“[W]e cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment embodies an inexo-
rable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and 
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.”). 
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guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the Constitution.28 In 
the landmark case Gideon v Wainwright,29 Clarence Earl Gideon 
was charged in Florida state court with breaking and entering 
with intent to commit petty larceny.30 Gideon appeared alone in 
court and requested a court-appointed attorney to assist his case. 
The Florida court declined, as Florida did not provide counsel for 
criminal defendants in noncapital cases.31 After granting certio-
rari,32 the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause re-
quires states to provide counsel in noncapital criminal cases, 
overturning Betts. The Court focused on the “fundamental” na-
ture of the right, comparing it favorably to rights like freedom of 
speech and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and the 
Court held that the Due Process Clause prohibited states from 
violating the right.33 This holding, along with its extension to mis-
demeanors in Argersinger v Hamlin,34 established the modern 
right to counsel in all criminal cases.35 
Following Gideon, legal activists began a push to extend the 
right to counsel into the civil sphere. Advocates argued that the 
right to counsel should be extended to civil cases in which the lit-
igants’ essential rights were at stake.36 Those activists have had 
limited success; the Supreme Court has declined to find a right to 
counsel in civil litigation. In one notable case, Lassiter v  
Department of Social Services,37 the appellant argued that failing 
to provide counsel in a civil suit that would terminate parental 
rights violated the Due Process Clause.38 A 5–4 majority on the 
Supreme Court held that there was no general right to appoint-
ment of counsel in parental termination proceedings despite the 
importance of the right involved. The Court explained that a  
litigant’s interest in personal liberty, not the general interests of 
 
 28 Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 341 (1963). 
 29 372 US 335 (1963). 
 30 Id at 336. 
 31 Id at 337. 
 32 Famously, Gideon submitted a handwritten petition for certiorari. See generally 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Gideon v Wainwright, No 155 (US filed Jan 5, 1962), 
archived at http://perma.cc/EZ34-ZMLZ. 
 33 Gideon, 372 US at 341–43. 
 34 407 US 25 (1972). 
 35 See Gideon, 372 US at 343–45; Argersinger, 407 US at 37 (extending Gideon to 
cover misdemeanor, as well as felony, offenses for which imprisionment could be imposed). 
 36 See Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 
Fla L Rev 1227, 1238–41 (2010) (discussing the post-Gideon wave of civil litigation aimed 
toward extending its logic and protections to civil pro se litigants). 
 37 452 US 18 (1981). 
 38 Id at 24. 
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litigants in vindicating legal rights, was the critical question in 
determining whether the litigant has a right to counsel.39 Accord-
ingly, in a blow to civil Gideon activists, the Supreme Court held 
that there was a “presumption that there is no right to appointed 
counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of phys-
ical liberty,” signaling the Supreme Court’s reluctance to extend 
the right to counsel to civil litigants.40 Lassiter remains good law. 
Turner, the most recent Supreme Court ruling on the rights 
of civil pro se litigants, threw an unexpected twist into this line of 
cases and provided fodder for both proponents and detractors of 
the expanded right to counsel for civil litigants. In Turner, all nine 
justices agreed that the state was not required to provide counsel 
in a civil contempt hearing even if the contempt order would have 
resulted in incarceration.41 Nonetheless, a five-justice majority 
overturned the sentence, holding that the state must “have in 
place alternative procedures that ensure a fundamentally fair de-
termination of the critical incarceration-related question.”42 The 
Court highlighted a “set of ‘substitute procedural safeguards’”—
for example, notice about critical issues in the case, the use of 
forms to elicit relevant information, and other potential protec-
tions—that could stand in for assistance of counsel and ensure 
the “‘fundamental fairness’ of the proceeding even where the 
State does not pay for counsel for an indigent defendant.”43 
Commentators have seen Turner as a complete rejection of 
civil Gideon, effectively foreclosing the possibility of an expanded 
right to counsel in civil litigation, at least for the foreseeable fu-
ture.44 However, commentators have also seen the holding in 
Turner—that due process requires trial courts to protect pro se 
 
 39 Id at 26. 
 40 Id at 31. 
 41 Turner, 564 US at 435. Arguably, this goes even further than Lassiter in denying 
the right to counsel for civil litigants; under Lassiter, there arguably should have been a 
presumption in favor of the right to appointed counsel because there was a “potential dep-
rivation of physical liberty.” Lassiter, 452 US at 31. 
 42 Turner, 564 US at 435. 
 43 Id at 447–48 (citations omitted). Note that safeguards, such as additional forms to 
elicit relevant information or additional notice about critical issues, are potentially simi-
lar, though not identical, to reforms such as giving pro se litigants access to an electronic 
version of the docket or allowing additional communication with a clerk at the court (the 
reforms analyzed in Part III). 
 44 Or at least foreclosing the possibility of the Supreme Court expanding the right to 
counsel for civil litigants. See Steinberg, 47 Conn L Rev at 788 (cited in note 9) (noting 
that “[t]he court unanimously rejected a guarantee of counsel, greatly disappointing civil 
Gideon proponents”); Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 970 (cited in note 5) (noting 
that “Turner dealt the death blow to hopes for a federally imposed civil Gideon”). 
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litigants’ rights via procedural safeguards—as a nod toward a 
new and potentially more fruitful approach to pro se litigation: 
reforms in trial courts.45 
B. Commentary and Debate: Civil Gideon 
The movement for civil Gideon began shortly after the hold-
ing in Gideon established the modern understanding of the right 
to counsel in criminal cases.46 Although there is some disagree-
ment among its supporters about the proper breadth of civil  
Gideon, the movement has generally focused on providing counsel 
for indigent parties in proceedings involving threats to their basic 
needs.47 From the movement’s inception, commentators have been 
divided over the merits of civil Gideon. Advocates have put forth 
a number of arguments in favor of civil Gideon. They have argued 
that representation in civil litigation secures constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection of law, is necessary to ensure 
fair trials, is “sound social policy,” and helps ensure more con-
sistent outcomes for defendants.48 Critics have countered with 
both direct refutations and alternative suggestions. They have ar-
gued that Gideon wasn’t that effective in aiding criminal defend-
ants, so civil Gideon would not be either; civil Gideon would be 
 
 45 See Steinberg, 47 Conn L Rev at 788 (cited in note 9) (noting that, “in an unantici-
pated twist, the Court adopted a new due process standard . . . requiring that trial courts 
implement ‘substitute procedural safeguards’ for unrepresented parties”); Barton and  
Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 970 (cited in note 5) (noting that, “[i]n rejecting a broad new con-
stitutional right, the Court steered toward more sustainable reform for pro se litigants”). 
 46 See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 978 (cited in note 5) (“Calls for a parallel 
Gideon right in civil cases followed almost immediately on the heels of Gideon. As early as 
1965, an indigent litigant argued [for the provision of counsel in a civil suit].”). 
 47 See, for example, D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, and Jonathan 
Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a  
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 Harv L Rev 901, 914 n 57 
(2013) (discussing a recent American Bar Association (ABA) recommendation to provide 
pro bono counsel to civil litigants in cases involving “direct threats to the provisions of 
basic human needs, including shelter”). The ABA has also recommended appointed coun-
sel for cases involving sustenance, safety, health, child custody, or removal proceedings, 
highlighting the breadth of potential “basic needs” that some advocates believe merit the 
appointment of counsel in civil pro se litigation. See, for example, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum  
Adjudication, 60 Stan L Rev 295, 384 (2007), citing Resolution 112A (American Bar  
Association House of Delegates, Aug 7, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/A98M-RGG3. 
 48 Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings 
Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 Cardozo Pub L Pol & Ethics J 699, 701–03 (2006). See 
also, for example, Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag, 60 Stan L Rev at 384 (cited in 
note 47). The arguments in these articles focus on civil litigation regarding housing or 
immigration, but the arguments hold more generally when a party’s ability to vindicate 
important interests is at stake. 
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ineffective notwithstanding the effectiveness of Gideon; civil  
Gideon would undermine criminal defense by reallocating legal 
resources to civil litigation; and, regardless of whether it would 
be a good idea, it simply isn’t realistic to expect any judicially cre-
ated civil Gideon given the current composition of the Supreme 
Court.49 
Proponents and detractors within the civil Gideon debate dis-
agree on how effective civil Gideon would be in improving case 
outcomes for pro se litigants. One reason for this is that commen-
tators disagree about how effective Gideon itself has been at im-
proving case outcomes for criminal defendants.50 Many of the rea-
sons commonly given for the failure of Gideon, such as the 
political difficulty of allocating sufficient resources to defense law-
yers and the high bar for claiming ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, would likely apply with equal or greater force in the context 
of civil Gideon.51 
Beyond the difficulties specific to civil Gideon, there is also 
empirical uncertainty regarding the value of access to counsel. 
Dozens of experimental studies have attempted to shed light on 
the effectiveness of attorneys in various settings in aiding 
litigants who would otherwise be proceeding pro se.52 One 2010 
meta-study conducted on a selection of prior studies suggested 
that representation by counsel improved a party’s odds of winning 
a suit by a factor between 1.19 and 13.79.53 While those numbers 
suggest that access to counsel probably increases a litigant’s odds 
 
 49 See, for example, Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 980 (cited in note 5) (iden-
tifying flaws in the arguments of civil Gideon advocates); Barton, 62 Fla L Rev at 1249 
(cited in note 36) (describing it as “quite unlikely that the current Court would even take 
a civil Gideon case”). See also generally Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: 
Lessons from Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 Temple Political & CR L Rev 527 (2006). 
 50 For one helpful discussion of how and why the efficacy of Gideon has been doubted, 
see Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev 883, 894–99 (2013). But see Wilkinson, 67 Vand 
L Rev at 1127–29 (cited in note 3) (arguing that criminal defense lawyers appointed to 
represent indigent defendants are typically effective). 
 51 See Dripps, 70 Wash & Lee L Rev at 895–99 (cited in note 50). 
 52 For a list of numerous such efforts, see D. James Greiner and Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Represen-
tation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 Yale L J 2118, 2175–79 n 154 (2012). 
 53 A factor of 1.19 indicates that a represented litigant is 1.19 times more likely to win 
than a pro se litigant in the same case. Some of these studies were conducted in different 
litigation contexts, and there is no a priori reason to believe that access to counsel has a 
similar impact on all types of litigation, so a large range in win ratios like the one seen here 
could conceivably be accurate. Still, the gap between a win ratio of 1.19 and 13.79 is suffi-
ciently large to suggest uncertainty in these results. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of 
Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 Seattle J Soc Just 51, 70 (2010). 
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of winning a case by at least some margin, the size of the range 
limits the value of these studies to policymakers.54 There is also 
debate concerning the quality of most of these studies. A 2012 
article by Professor D. James Greiner and Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak looked at dozens of previous studies to quantify the 
added value of access to counsel and found almost all of those 
studies were unable to accurately measure the effect of access to 
counsel.55 
However, the few reliable studies conducted thus far tend to 
suggest that providing access to counsel significantly improves 
outcomes for civil litigants. Greiner and Pattanayak identified 
two prior studies that were properly conducted to evaluate the 
effects of access to counsel. While noting it was premature to draw 
conclusions, they pointed out that one of those studies found that 
access to counsel was effective in improving case outcomes, and 
the other study found it effective in improving case outcomes in 
one of its two experimental settings.56 A follow-up experiment by 
Greiner, Pattanayak, and Jonathan Hennessy found that the as-
sistance of counsel led to a significant improvement in litigation 
outcomes compared to more piecemeal assistance.57 Specifically, 
they found that, from a sample of litigants facing eviction in a 
district court, about one-third retained their rental units after re-
ceiving unbundled legal assistance—legal aid short of an  
attorney-client relationship—whereas approximately two-thirds 
retained their units after receiving both unbundled legal assis-
tance and representation by counsel.58 Overall, though the body 
of evidence is still limited, the empirical evidence suggests that 
providing lawyers for pro se litigants substantially improves case 
outcomes for those litigants. Critically, this implies that provid-
ing adequate access to counsel may substantially improve case 
outcomes for a meaningful percentage of pro se litigants.59 
 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Greiner and Pattanayak, 121 Yale L J at 2196–98 (cited in note 52). 
 56 See id at 2197–98. 
 57 See Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 919–20 (cited in 
note 47). 
 58 See id at 925–31. 
 59 However, it is likely premature to express confidence about how these results 
would transfer to other types of litigation; it may be the case that access to counsel is 
especially effective (or, for that matter, ineffective) at improving case outcomes for pro se 
litigants in the housing context. 
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C. A Happy Medium? Pro Se Reform in Trial Courts 
As the plausibility of civil Gideon has diminished in the wake 
of Turner, trial court reforms for pro se litigants have emerged as 
a compromise. Both proponents and critics of civil Gideon see ma-
jor potential benefits of pro se reform: it is a low-cost option that 
could conceivably provide meaningful benefits to pro se litigants 
without diverting legal resources from more critical cases, it helps 
ensure pro se litigants will receive fundamentally fair hearings, 
and it is a more politically and jurisprudentially feasible solution 
than civil Gideon.60 
Some still remain skeptical about pro se reform. Commenta-
tors have argued that unfair advantages for pro se litigants cor-
respond to unfair disadvantages for their opponents in civil pro-
ceedings, that tweaking the court system specifically for pro se 
litigants undermines the rule of law, and that reforms may lead 
courts to devote more resources to cases that often prove frivo-
lous.61 Other detractors of trial-court reform for pro se litigants 
have opposed it on opposite grounds, arguing that these reforms 
may be counterproductive and harm pro se litigants62 or that they 
don’t go far enough and that civil Gideon is needed to fully protect 
the rights of pro se litigants.63 
Unlike civil Gideon advocates, reform advocates have been 
successful in implementing pro se reform. A 2011 survey by the 
Federal Judicial Center of United States District Courts (“FJC 
Survey”) found that eighty-seven of ninety responding districts 
 
 60 See generally Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev 967 (cited in note 5); Steinberg, 
47 Conn L Rev 741 (cited in note 9). 
 61 See, for example, Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb 
Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 Am U L Rev 
1537, 1583–93 (2005) (arguing that, by playing an active role in the litigation process, a 
judge becomes an interested party and may become biased—which violates the ideal 
American judicial role of a “neutral referee”—and may be unfairly advantaged if they are 
excused for procedural mistakes while represented litigants still bear the costs of proce-
dural mistakes their lawyers may make). 
 62 See, for example, Robert Bacharach and Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro 
Se Litigation: A Return to Neutrality, 42 Ind L Rev 19, 34–35 (2009) (arguing that “ad hoc” 
rules applied to pro se litigants often end up disadvantaging rather than aiding pro se 
litigants, and specifically describing how attempts by judges to help pro se litigants make 
initial claims could lead to more dismissals of those claims, thus threatening their pauper 
status). 
 63 As an example, pro se reforms could be counterproductive in a streamlined pro se 
office at a district court that consistently suggests dismissing pro se cases before a full 
hearing. For a more detailed discussion of entities that have called for civil Gideon rather 
than pro se trial court reform, and the contexts in which they have done so, see Greiner, 
Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 906–07 (cited in note 47). 
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had implemented at least one program or procedure to assist pro 
se litigants.64 Similar reforms have been undertaken in at least 
some state and local courts as well.65 
Courts have implemented a number of different programs 
and procedures to assist pro se litigants. For example, the 2011 
FJC Survey revealed that twenty-five districts allowed pro se law 
clerks to directly communicate with pro se litigants about their 
cases; thirty-five districts allowed pro se litigants to electronically 
access information about the docket sheet, pleadings, and more 
through case management/electronic case filing (CM/ECF); nine-
teen disseminated information about programs for pro se litigants 
outside the court, such as in public libraries; and ten provided 
software specifically designed to help pro se litigants prepare 
their proceedings.66 These types of reforms mirror those suggested 
by the Supreme Court in Turner:67 for example, providing notice 
to pro se civil litigants of important issues affecting the case and 
using forms to solicit relevant information. Likewise, giving ac-
cess to the docket sheet and pleadings through CM/ECF and al-
lowing communication with a pro se law clerk somewhat fulfills 
the Supreme Court’s suggestion to increase efforts to provide pro 
se litigants with notice. The pro se software typically helps sim-
plify filing and participation in civil proceedings, similar to forms 
that would solicit relevant information.  
Courts and commentators appear to believe these reforms 
are effective. Chief judges and clerks of courts were asked in the 
FJC Survey about the most effective measures for helping 
nonprisoner pro se litigants. Tables 1.1 and 1.2, reproduced from 
the FJC Survey below, show that both clerks’ offices and chief 
judges at district courts believe measures like those discussed 
above are effective at improving outcomes for nonprisoner pro se 
litigants.68 
 
 64 See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.  
District Courts at *1 (cited in note 11). 
 65 See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 988 (cited in note 5) (noting that civil 
courts in San Antonio have been experimenting with pro se reforms). 
 66 See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.  
District Courts at *2 (cited in note 11). 
 67 If anything, district courts have implemented reforms that go beyond those sug-
gested by the Supreme Court; consequently, it seems likely that efforts to meet the  
Supreme Court’s criteria would be no more effective than these pro se reforms. 
 68 Table 1A records the responses of clerks’ offices to the question “What are the most 
effective measures your district has implemented to date to help the clerk’s office, prisoner 
pro se litigants, and nonprisoner pro se litigants?” under the sections “Measures that help 
nonprisoner pro se litigants.” Importantly, this is separated from “Measures that help the 
2018] Empirical Patterns of Pro Se Litigation 1833 
 
 
TABLE 1A:  MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES THAT HELP 
NONPRISONER PRO SE LITIGANTS, AS NOTED BY  
CLERKS’ OFFICES69 
Measures Number of Mentionsa 
Information and guidance tailored to the pro se 
litigant (for example, standardized forms,  
instructions, or handbooks) and made readily 
available (for example, on the web or at a kiosk) 
48 
Pro bono program, mediation/settlement  
procedures, pro se help centers 
13 
E-filing, CM/ECF access 12 
Special staff arrangements or assignments, 
staff training, internal reports 
12 
Other 4 
a.  There were 66 respondents; they mentioned 89 measures. 
TABLE 1B:  MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES USED BY CLERKS’ 
OFFICES THAT HELP NONPRISONER PRO SE LITIGATION, AS 
NOTED BY CHIEF JUDGES70 
Measures Number of Mentionsa 
Handbooks; standardized forms; instructions; 
other materials 
33 
Personal assistance by clerk’s office staff and/or 
pro se law clerks 
9 
Specially designated staff; procedures for  
assigning and tracking cases; automation 
5 
Other 2 
a.  There were 33 respondents; they mentioned 49 measures. 
 
clerk’s office” and “Measures that help prisoner pro se litigants.” The responses to those 
latter questions differ meaningfully from the responses concerning measures effective at 
helping nonprisoner pro se litigants. The chief judges were similarly asked to separate 
measures that helped nonprisoner pro se litigants from measures that helped the court or 
prisoner pro se litigants. See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Liti-
gants in U.S. District Courts at *15, 17, 35, 54, 61 (cited in note 11). 
 69 Table 1A has been reproduced from the FJC Survey, in which it was originally 
labeled Table 15. Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. 
District Courts at *17 (cited in note 11). 
 70 Table 1B has been reproduced from the FJC Survey, in which it was originally 
labeled Table 29. Id at *35. 
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Tables 1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate that a large proportion of 
clerks’ offices and chief judges at district courts believe that pro 
se reform measures are helpful to nonprisoner pro se litigants.71 
For example, the majority of clerks’ offices surveyed in the FJC 
Survey believe that making information and guidance tailored to 
pro se litigants readily available is one of the most effective 
measures for helping nonprisoner pro se litigants. The vast ma-
jority of responding chief judges believe handbooks and standard-
ized materials are helpful, and about 25 percent of chief judges 
surveyed believe that personal assistance by the clerk’s office 
staff is helpful to pro se litigants. Often, these handbooks and 
standardized materials are extensive. For example, the Northern 
District of Illinois’s website currently has a thirty-five-page gen-
eralized handbook advising pro se litigants72 and specific instruc-
tions and forms for how to handle civil rights, employment dis-
crimination, and mortgage foreclosure cases.73 
Despite courts’ and commentators’ optimism about these re-
forms, there has been no publicly available empirical analysis of 
the effects of these reforms on case outcomes in pro se litigation 
thus far. There is some literature discussing the impacts of pro se 
court reforms in a more general sense,74 but that literature does 
not focus on the effect on case outcomes. This Comment seeks to 
fill that gap by providing an initial analysis of how reforms im-
plemented by courts thus far have impacted case outcomes for pro 
se litigants.75 
II.  EMPIRICAL SUMMARY OF PRO SE LITIGATION 
This Part discusses trends in civil pro se litigation in federal 
district courts. It examines several important characteristics of 
pro se litigation: the volume, typical outcomes, and typical types 
 
 71 The questionnaire does not go into further detail about what “helping” nonprisoner 
pro se litigants means. Accordingly, it is possible that judges believe these reforms are 
helping pro se litigants in ways other than helping them win more cases. 
 72 See generally Filing a Civil Case without an Attorney: A Guide for the Pro Se Liti-
gant (United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Sept 30, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/CGA6-TKR8. 
 73 See Pro Se Information (United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/P6JD-2WNF. 
 74 See generally, for example, Lois Bloom and Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Mag-
istrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 475 (2002). 
 75 As discussed elsewhere, this Comment does not purport to claim that impacts on 
case outcomes are the only potentially important effect of these reforms nor that the re-
forms fail by those other metrics. For a more detailed discussion, see Part III.A. 
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of suits brought by pro se litigants. It then describes some impli-
cations of this data and thus helps contextualize the empirical 
analyses of pro se reforms that Parts III and IV present. 
A. Sample 
The primary dataset used in this Comment consists of admin-
istrative records of civil cases filed in federal district courts, which 
are collected and published by the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts (AO).76 The AO dataset includes the district 
court in which the case was filed, the docket number of each case, 
the date on which the case was filed, the nature of the suit, the 
procedural progress of the case at the time the case was disposed 
of, the manner in which the case was disposed of, the party that 
the final judgment of the case was in favor of, and whether the 
plaintiff or the defendant was a pro se party.77 
  
 
 76 It is important to note that, although this Comment is limited to analyzing suits 
filed in federal district courts, a large volume of pro se litigation occurs in state courts. 
Some specialized courts, such as those focused on domestic relations, have high portions 
of their dockets devoted to pro se cases. However, many nonspecialized state courts also 
have a significant volume of pro se cases. Further, many pro se litigants in federal district 
courts appeal their cases, resulting in substantial pro se litigation in federal appellate 
courts. For more discussion of pro se litigation throughout the US legal system, see gen-
erally, Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 Lewis & Clark 
L Rev 439 (2009). For one example of pro se reform undertaken by specific state courts 
and the effects of those reforms on litigation, see Eovaldi and Meyers, 72 Nw U L Rev at 
975–78 (cited in note 4). 
 77 For more discussion of the nature of these fields and other data contained in the 
AO dataset, see generally Integrated Data Base Civil Documentation (Federal Judicial 
Center, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/LT4F-2W5E. Additionally, several other fields 
are used in the data processing that is conducted before the analysis, such as using the 
docket number assigned by the district court to avoid double-counting cases. For more 
discussion of the data cleaning process, including the data used in that process, see  
Appendix: AO Data Processing. 
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TABLE 2A:  NUMBER OF CASES FILED IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS, PRO SE VERSUS REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 
 ’98–’01 ’02–’05 ’06–’09 ’10–’13 
  Cases Per Year, thousands 
Both Parties Represented 145 167 175 185 
Pro Se Plaintiffs 15 17 18 21 
Pro Se Defendants 3 4 4 5 
% Pro Se Plaintiffs  9.1% 9.0% 9.0% 9.8% 
% Pro Se Defendants 
 
1.9% 2.2% 1.9% 2.5% 
 
As seen in Table 2A, civil nonprisoner pro se litigation ap-
pears to comprise a stable proportion of federal district courts’ 
dockets.78 Averaged over several four-year time periods, the per-
centage of cases in federal district courts that were filed by pro se 
plaintiffs has ranged only from 9 to 10 percent. However, that still 
constitutes an average of more than fifteen thousand federal dis-
trict court cases each year involving nonprisoner pro se plaintiffs. 
Similarly, the percentage of cases that have been answered by pro 
se defendants has hovered around 2 percent. 
Commentators writing about pro se litigation over the past 
twenty years have typically described pro se litigation as a large 
and growing portion of the federal docket.79 However, when the 
scope of the inquiry is limited to nonprisoner pro se litigation, this 
trend does not show up in the AO data. There has been a mean-
ingful upward trend in the total number of pro se cases. But the 
percent of cases brought by pro se plaintiffs has not changed sig-
nificantly, as seen in Table 2A, suggesting pro se litigation com-
prises a relatively stable portion of the federal docket. 
The exclusion of prisoner pro se litigation is a potentially con-
sequential choice. Commentators sometimes discuss trends in 
prisoner and nonprisoner civil pro se litigation without differen-
tiating between the two classes, but there is no reason to assume 
that trends in prisoner pro se litigation mirror trends in 
 
 78 Civil pro se litigation by prisoners is heavily concentrated in two pseudocriminal 
types of proceedings: prisoner habeas corpus petitions (nature of suit code 530) and pris-
oner civil rights petitions (nature of suit code 550). For a more detailed description of these 
fields, see generally Integrated Data Base Civil Documentation (cited in note 77). 
 79 See, for example, Landsman, 13 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 441–42 (cited in note 76). 
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nonprisoner pro se litigation.80 Prisoner pro se litigation may be 
an interesting topic of its own. However, most prisoner litigation 
consists of several unique case types that are pseudocriminal in 
nature, particularly habeas petitions, that are not necessarily 
similar to other types of civil pro se litigation. Accordingly, the 
scope of this Comment excludes cases that are predominantly 
brought by prisoners in order to focus more narrowly on the dy-
namics of civil nonprisoner pro se litigation in federal district 
courts.81 
B. Case Outcomes for Pro Se Litigants in Federal District 
Courts 
One of the most important aspects of pro se litigation in fed-
eral district courts is that pro se litigants fare extremely poorly. 
This is generally understood in the literature.82 However, the 
magnitude of the disparity between pro se and represented liti-
gants is not always highlighted. Accordingly, this Section pre-
sents statistics on typical outcomes for represented and pro se lit-
igants in trial. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the win rates of plaintiffs 
and defendants in cases that reach a final judgment based on 
whether both parties are represented, the plaintiff is proceeding 
pro se, or the defendant is proceeding pro se. 
  
 
 80 There are many factors affecting trends in prisoner pro se litigation that likely do 
not impact nonprisoner pro se litigation, such as the growth of the US prison population 
and concerns about the particular conditions and resources available to prisoners. For one 
discussion of prisoner pro se litigation, see generally Michael W. Martin, Foreword: Root 
Causes of the Pro Se Prisoner Litigation Crisis, 80 Fordham L Rev 1219 (2011). 
 81 Some reasons that these reforms may impact prisoners differently from nonprison-
ers include: differences in the types of cases brought, potentially different access to legal 
resources (depending on the availability of legal materials in prison), different judicial 
attitudes toward prisoner and nonprisoner pro se litigants, or different levels of access to 
counsel. Note that this Comment does not definitively suggest these reforms impact 
nonprisoner and prisoner pro se litigants differently. Instead, it merely suggests there 
may be differences and limits the scope of this analysis to nonprisoner pro se litigants. 
 82 See, for example, Landsman, 13 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 442 (cited in note 76). 
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TABLE 2B:  OUTCOMES OF CASES REACHING FINAL JUDGMENT, 
PRO SE VERSUS REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, 1998–2017 






Plaintiff 3% 73% 42% 
Defendant 82% 12% 42% 
Both 1% 3% 4% 
Missing/ 
Unknown 
14% 12% 10% 
TABLE 2C:  OUTCOMES OF CASES REACHING FINAL JUDGMENT 
FOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT, PRO SE VERSUS REPRESENTED 
LITIGANTS, 1998–201783 






Plaintiff 4% 86% 51% 
Defendant 96% 14% 49% 
 
As Tables 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, the presence of a pro se 
plaintiff or pro se defendant dramatically changes the dynamics 
of litigation. When both parties are represented and there is a 
recorded final judgment for either the plaintiff or the defendant, 
the plaintiff and the defendant each win roughly 50 percent of the 
time. When the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the plaintiff instead wins 
about 4 percent of the time. When the defendant proceeds pro se, 
the plaintiff wins 86 percent of the time. These differences are 
stark. A represented defendant will nearly always prevail over a 
pro se plaintiff in court. A represented plaintiff will win almost as 
consistently against a pro se defendant. 
Though dramatic, these numbers do not necessarily imply 
that lack of access to counsel worsens case outcomes for pro se 
 
 83 Table 2C simply removes cases classified as “Missing/Unknown” or “Both” from 
Table 2B and recalculates the percentages. All analyses of cases reaching final judgment 
in this Comment focus on the subset of case dispositions that commonly reach final judg-
ment. Cases dismissed for want of prosecution, that settle, or that otherwise do not typi-
cally receive entry of final judgment on resolution are excluded from these analyses. For 
more discussion of the calculation methodology, see Appendix: AO Data Processing. 
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litigants. There are a number of plausible explanations for low 
win rates by pro se litigants even if pro se litigants are not disad-
vantaged in court. For instance, and likely most significantly, be-
cause lawyers frequently work on a contingency fee basis, a law-
yer is more likely to agree to work on behalf of a plaintiff with a 
strong case than a plaintiff with a weak case.84 The stronger the 
plaintiff’s case, the higher the expected damages and expected 
payout for the lawyer. Hence, it is less likely that strong cases 
proceed pro se. 
While the outcome gap between pro se and represented liti-
gants does not necessarily prove that lack of access to counsel 
causes poor case outcomes for pro se litigants, it is easy to see how 
it motivates proponents of pro se court reforms or civil Gideon. 
Table 2C suggests that, whenever one of the parties is proceeding 
pro se, the likelihood that any final judgment will be registered 
for the other party is overwhelming. If one believes that a mean-
ingful portion of pro se litigants have important rights that they 
are seeking to vindicate in court, it is likely they are not receiving 
adequate remedies under the current legal system.85 
C. Types of Suits Brought by Pro Se Litigants 
Another important aspect of pro se litigation to examine is 
the types of suits regularly brought by pro se litigants. This  
Section provides several tables that highlight the frequency of pro 
se litigants across different types of legal claims and show which 
specific case types most frequently feature pro se litigants. De-
spite the fact that roughly 10 percent of federal district court liti-
gation involves a pro se plaintiff, some types of litigation very 
rarely involve pro se plaintiffs, while other types of cases are 
brought by pro se plaintiffs much more than 10 percent of the 
time. The story is similar for pro se defendants, though the vari-
ation is less dramatic because pro se defendants comprise only 2 
 
 84 For one discussion of this phenomenon, see John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Fac-
tor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L J 473, 475–82 (1981). 
 85 Although it’s difficult to pinpoint the factors most responsible for the unfavorable 
outcomes for many or most pro se litigants, some issues that many district judges cite in 
explaining the typical challenges of pro se litigants include: pro se plaintiffs’ lack of ability 
to write legally comprehensible pleadings or submissions, lack of ability to respond to legal 
motions in fruitful ways, lack of knowledge about relevant legal precedents, issues with 
timeliness in the legal process, and failure to understand the legal consequences of their 
actions. For a more complete list of issues that judges perceive pro se litigants face, see 
Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. District Courts 
at *21–23 (cited in note 11). 
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percent of defendants in civil suits in federal district courts. Even 
in light of this variance, pro se litigants comprise a significant 
raw number of civil suits in all categories. 
TABLE 2D:  NUMBER OF CASES BY NATURE OF SUIT, PRO SE 
VERSUS REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, 1998–2017 
Suit Category Total Cases % Pro Se 
 Thousands Plaintiff Defendant 
Products Liability 19.2 2% 0% 
Civil Rights 17.9 32% 2% 
Tort 16.7 7% 1% 
Labor 15.5 3% 2% 
Government 15.1 8% 2% 
Contract 15.0 4% 3% 
Employment  
Discrimination 
14.5 19% 0% 
Statute 11.2 11% 4% 
Asbestos 11.1 1% 0% 
Insurance 8.4 2% 2% 
Property 6.2 13% 12% 
Financial 6.1 13% 4% 
Administrative 5.7 8% 3% 
Other 14.3 7% 4% 
All 176.8 9% 2% 
 
Table 2D shows the most common types of litigation in federal 
district courts and the frequency with which each type of case in-
volves a pro se plaintiff or defendant. Pro se plaintiffs bring a dis-
proportionately large percent of civil rights and employment dis-
crimination cases. In contrast, pro se plaintiffs rarely bring other 
types of cases, such as products liability, contract, asbestos, and 
insurance cases.86 Table 2D also shows that the only types of cases 
that frequently involve pro se defendants are property cases, which 
 
 86 This is unsurprising given the large financial stakes often involved in those cases 
and the prospective availability of contingency fees. 
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are primarily foreclosure proceedings.87 Perhaps the most im-
portant takeaway from Table 2D is that a substantial proportion 
of many types of cases are brought by pro se plaintiffs. Though 
there is significant variance—pro se litigants bring 32 percent of 
civil rights cases but bring a more modest 8 percent of cases involv-
ing the government and 2 percent of insurance and product liabil-
ity cases—pro se litigants are prevalent across many types of cases. 
Any reforms targeting just one type of lawsuit cannot fully address 
the scope of issues faced by pro se litigants. 
Tables 2E and 2F, the final tables in this Part, examine how 
win rates for pro se litigants vary across different types of cases. 
The win ratios in Table 2E compare the probability of a plaintiff 
winning when both parties are represented to the probability of a 
plaintiff winning when the plaintiff is a pro se plaintiff but the 
defendant is represented. In the column “Plaint Rep’d / Plaint Pro 
Se,” the number 2.0 would mean that plaintiffs win twice as often 
when both parties are represented as compared to cases in which 
the plaintiff is pro se. The higher the number, the better repre-
sented litigants fare relative to pro se litigants. 
Next, Table 2F compares the probability of a plaintiff win-
ning when both parties are represented to the probability of a 
plaintiff winning when the plaintiff is represented but the defend-
ant is a pro se defendant. In the column, “Def Rep’d / Def Pro Se,” 
the number 0.5 would mean that plaintiffs win half as often when 
both parties are represented as compared to cases in which the 
defendant is pro se. The lower the number, the better represented 
litigants fare relative to pro se litigants.88 
  
 
 87 In fact, there is an upward trend over time in the percentage of property suits 
involving a pro se defendant. Among property suits filed in district courts in 2016, 23 per-
cent involved a pro se defendant (based on the data used in Table 2D). 
 88 There were no cases in the sample in which a defendant in an asbestos case pro-
ceeded on a pro se basis and the plaintiff won the case. Accordingly, “N/A” is recorded for 
the numbers that would otherwise have this zero in the denominator. 
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TABLE 2E:  WIN RATES BY NATURE OF SUIT, PRO SE V 
REPRESENTED PLAINTIFFS, 1998–2017 
















19.2 5% 13% 2.5 
Civil Rights 17.9 2% 18% 11.5 
Tort 16.7 3% 32% 9.8 
Labor 15.5 10% 76% 8.0 
Government 15.1 9% 25% 2.7 




14.5 2% 13% 6.6 
Statute 11.2 5% 64% 13.1 
Asbestos 11.1 11% 15% 1.4 
Insurance 8.4 3% 43% 13.3 
Property 6.2 2% 77% 42.1 
Financial 6.1 9% 49% 5.3 
Administra-
tive 
5.7 4% 71% 16.2 
Other 14.3 8% 77% 9.9 
All 176.8 4% 51% 13.7 
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TABLE 2F:  WIN RATES BY NATURE OF SUIT, PRO SE VERSUS 
REPRESENTED DEFENDANTS, 1998–2017 















19.2 82% 13% 0.2 
Civil Rights 17.9 43% 18% 0.4 
Tort 16.7 67% 32% 0.5 
Labor 15.5 90% 76% 0.8 
Government 15.1 84% 25% 0.3 
Contract 15.0 92% 69% 0.8 
Employment 
Discrimination 
14.5 61% 13% 0.2 
Statute 11.2 89% 64% 0.7 
Asbestos 11.1 0% 15% N/A 
Insurance 8.4 67% 43% 0.6 
Property 6.2 87% 77% 0.9 
Financial 6.1 9% 49% 0.6 
Administrative 5.7 4% 71% 0.8 
Other 14.3 93% 77% 0.8 
All 176.8 86% 51% 0.6 
 
Tables 2E and 2F show that there is considerable variance in 
the outcomes of different types of cases for both represented and 
pro se litigants. When plaintiffs proceed pro se, they win some-
where between 2 and 11 percent of cases, depending on the nature 
of the suit. When the defendant is pro se and the plaintiff is rep-
resented, the plaintiff wins somewhere between 43 percent and 
93 percent of cases,89 depending on the nature of the suit. This 
substantial variance is not confined to pro se litigants. Even when 
both parties are represented, there is wide variance in the per-
centages of cases won by plaintiffs, ranging from just 13 percent 
in products liability and employment discrimination cases to 77 
 
 89 With the exception of asbestos litigation. However, there were only two asbestos 
cases in the sample with pro se defendants. 
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percent in property cases.90 But in essentially all categories, pro 
se litigants fare far worse than represented litigants. 
The relative win ratios tell a similar story. There is wide var-
iance based on the type of lawsuit being brought, but represented 
litigants consistently have far better outcomes than pro se liti-
gants in court. When both parties are represented, plaintiffs win 
at a rate between 1.4 and 42.1 times as often as when only the 
defendant is represented. By contrast, a represented plaintiff is 
roughly 0.2 to 0.9 times as likely to win a case against a repre-
sented defendant as against a pro se defendant.91 
As Table 2D shows, pro se litigation comprises a significant 
fraction of almost all types of lawsuits in federal district courts. 
And as seen in Tables 2E and 2F, across essentially all of those 
lawsuits, pro se litigants fare dramatically worse than their rep-
resented counterparts. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF PRO SE REFORM 
This Part presents an empirical analysis of pro se reforms 
made in federal district courts. It compares outcomes for pro se 
litigants in courts that have implemented reforms with outcomes 
for pro se litigants in courts that have not implemented reforms. 
The analysis discovers that outcomes are not substantially differ-
ent in courts that have made these reforms. Hence, this Part sug-
gests that pro se reforms in federal district courts have not im-
pacted outcomes of pro se litigation despite evidence that clerks 
and judges in those courts believe the reforms are effective at 
achieving this goal. 
A. Discussion of Data 
The analysis in this Part draws upon two different sources of 
data. The first data source is the same dataset used for the 
analysis in Part II: the AO Dataset containing civil cases filed in 
US district courts. 
 
 90 The low percentages here may reflect high settlement rates for strong products 
liability or asbestos cases so that many cases that plaintiffs would win instead settle. 
 91 Property cases are an interesting exception, with a represented plaintiff still 0.88 
times as likely to win a case against a represented litigant as against a pro se defendant. 
Though the noncausal nature of the comparisons weighs against drawing any overly sig-
nificant inferences from this fact, it does suggest that the trend toward increasing num-
bers of defendants proceeding pro se in property suits might not be a particularly im-
portant issue. 
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The second data source for this analysis is the 2011 FJC  
Survey.92 The survey administrators sent two separate question-
naires to US federal district courts: one for clerks of the court and 
one for chief judges. Ninety US district courts responded to the 
questionnaire directed to clerks of the court. This analysis draws 
upon those responses.93 
One part of that questionnaire focused on the procedural 
steps that clerks’ offices took to assist pro se litigants, either 
through programs and procedures or efforts to improve access to 
counsel. The survey asked about eighteen different services, pro-
grams, or procedures that at least some district courts have im-
plemented to assist nonprisoner pro se litigants.94 The appendix 
to that survey describes which of the responding district courts 
had implemented those policies as of the survey date for fifteen of 
those eighteen policies.95 
There are several important limitations to using this data. 
First, the exact date of the survey is unclear and, relatedly, the 
exact dates that each district court responded that it was employ-
ing or not employing these procedures is uncertain. The analysis 
is conducted using cases filed between 2008 and 2010. Accord-
ingly, if a large number of district courts altered their policies 
shortly before this survey was conducted or if the survey was con-
ducted substantially before the survey was published, it’s possible 
that this analysis would undercount the effects of those policies. 
In either of those scenarios, the full consequences of these reforms 
might not be seen in the 2008–2010 data sample. However, there 
is no information suggesting that either possibility is reflected in 
reality. Courts and commentators have been discussing and at-
tempting to solve the challenges of pro se litigation for decades 
 
 92 See note 64 and accompanying text. 
 93 The questionnaire directed to chief judges did not include comparable questions 
about policies that district courts have implemented to assist nonprisoner pro se litigants. 
 94 See the policies listed in Tables 1 and 2 of Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, As-
sistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S. District Courts at *2–3 (cited in note 11). Note that 
there are two additional policies in those tables that are only for prisoner, as opposed to 
nonprisoner, pro se litigants and thus are excluded from this analysis. 
 95 Data is unavailable for three policies: procedural assistance by clerk’s office staff 
members as part of their regular duties, appointment of counsel to represent a pro se liti-
gant for the full case, and appointment of counsel to represent a pro se litigant in limited 
circumstances. See id. Although it would be interesting to conduct an analysis similar to 
that conducted in the following Section for each of these policies, there is no obvious reason 
that the absence of this data would undermine any of the following results beyond the fact 
that an analysis similar to that conducted below could conceivably come to different con-
clusions for those policies. 
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and implementing reforms for at least a decade; it seems unlikely 
that they all started implementing these solutions immediately 
prior to the survey.96 
More generally, win rates are an imperfect outcome variable 
for evaluating the effectiveness of pro se reform, and some caution 
is warranted when making inferences based on this analysis. The 
thorniest issue is that a large portion of civil cases are disposed of 
in ways that do not typically result in final judgments being en-
tered, so win rates do not directly shed light on how pro se liti-
gants fare in those cases. Some district court reforms might plau-
sibly result in more favorable settlements for pro se litigants, and 
thus improved outcomes for pro se litigants while not materially 
affecting the win rates of pro se litigants upon final judgment.97 
That said, there is a good theoretical reason to believe that win 
rates upon final judgment correlate with the favorability of set-
tlements: in typical litigation settings, if both parties have similar 
beliefs about the probability of winning at trial and make econom-
ically rational decisions, they ought to come to a settlement 
weighted to favor the party more likely to prevail at trial.98 The 
AO data, however, does not include any measure of settlement 
quality that could be used to confirm or analyze the relationship 
for these types of cases. 
Additionally, there is no obvious way to test the consistency 
or validity of these survey results. If different courts implemented 
substantively different reforms but mapped them to the same pol-
icies when answering the questionnaire, these results may under-
estimate the effectiveness of certain policies. For example, if one 
district court allowed pro se litigants to conduct extremely formal 
and limited communications with pro se clerks, while another dis-
trict court allowed pro se litigants who showed up at the court to 
receive extensive counseling from pro se clerks, both district 
courts may report that they provided “direct communications 
 
 96 For a discussion from the early 2000s, see Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 Notre Dame J 
L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 488–97 (cited in note 74). To the extent that this is a risk, a follow-
up study could be conducted by surveying the current practices of district courts and then 
using a similar method to the one employed in this Comment to check whether differences 
in current district court practices are impacting more recent outcomes for pro se litigants. 
 97 Conceivably, these reforms could even adversely affect win rates by convincing pro 
se litigants with strong cases to accept favorable settlements. 
 98 See, for example, J.J. Prescott and Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of 
Civil Settlement, 91 NYU L Rev 59, 60–61 (2016). 
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with pro se clerks.”99 These two policies may be sufficiently dis-
tinct that they have very different influences on the outcomes of 
pro se litigation. The available survey data does not provide a re-
liable way to tease out these types of distinctions, and they are 
grouped together in the analysis below. Similarly, if overbur-
dened district courts were simply sloppy in their survey re-
sponses, this methodology may in turn underestimate the results 
of these policies. 
Although this analysis focuses on case outcomes, those are by 
no means the only potential metric for analyzing the impact of pro 
se reforms. Another relevant, tangible measure is the length of 
proceedings. Pro se reforms have the potential to greatly expedite 
pro se proceedings, helping to ensure that litigants are able to 
move on with their lives as quickly as possible. Shortened 
proceedings are valuable in their own right without impacting 
case outcomes. Less tangibly, it may be the case that pro se 
reforms improve the litigation experience for pro se litigants and 
help ensure that they feel they have had a fair hearing in court. 
Increasing satisfaction with court proceedings is a significant 
benefit to litigants and also boosts the public perception of the 
legal system—both valuable outcomes that would not show up in 
the analysis below.100 
Although case outcomes do not encompass all relevant infor-
mation in assessing the impact or value of pro se reforms, they 
are nonetheless an important metric to consider. Lawyers are 
supposed to help their clients win cases. Accordingly, the viability 
of pro se reform as a substitute for better access to counsel should 
hinge in large part on its effectiveness at helping pro se litigants 
win those cases. Moreover, case outcomes are the typical metric 
that commentators consider when measuring the value of access 
to counsel to pro se litigants.101 Hence, when evaluating the 
tradeoffs of expanding pro se reform against expanding access to 
counsel, case outcomes are one of the most natural and salient 
measures. 
 
 99 See Table 1 in Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in 
U.S. District Courts at *2 (cited in note 11). 
 100 For one discussion of potential benefits of litigation aside from the possibility of 
winning cases, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U Chi L Rev 1239, 
1251 (2010). 
 101 See notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
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B. Methodology 
The following Section conducts analysis aimed at evaluating 
the effectiveness of pro se reforms undertaken by district courts 
and reported in the FJC Survey. The outcome variable is the rate 
at which judgments are entered in favor of the plaintiff for the 
types of case dispositions in which final judgments are commonly 
entered.102 
The analysis compares differences in case outcomes in differ-
ent sets of district courts. The sets are determined either by 
whether the district court adopted a particular pro se reform or 
by the total number of reforms the district court has adopted. By 
comparing these results, this Part attempts to determine the ef-
fectiveness of these reforms. 
Unfortunately for this empirical exercise, district courts do 
not randomly decide whether to implement a particular reform. 
If these pro se reforms had been randomly assigned, then this 
analysis would mimic an experiment, and it would be safer to con-
clude (provided the statistics suggested so) that any differences 
in case outcomes shown in the tables below were causal. Without 
random assignment of pro se reforms to district courts, the con-
clusions of this analysis may suffer from selection bias. For exam-
ple, courts that are particularly favorable to pro se litigants might 
also be more likely to implement reforms. If pro se litigants hap-
pened to fare better in these courts, it would be difficult to empir-
ically discern whether litigants fare better because of the reforms 
or the favorable attitude, and some measure of the district court’s 
favorability toward pro se litigants could be an important omitted 
variable. 
There is good reason to believe, however, that there are not 
major omitted variable issues in this data. There are three poten-
tial omitted variables that are important to address here, but 
none seems likely to be a confounding factor in this analysis.103 
 
 102 The types of cases that typically result in final judgment, and are evaluated here, 
are cases that are disposed of following judgment on default, consent, motion before trial, 
jury verdict, directed verdict, court trial, arbitral award, or other resolution. Cases dis-
posed of via transfer or remand or dismissed due to settlement, voluntary dismissal, lack 
of jurisdiction, or want of prosecution are discarded in this analysis. 
 103 The concern with omitted variable bias is that some other variable not included in 
the model explains both the independent and dependent variable in the model. For exam-
ple, in this case there could be an “omitted variable” measuring how much courts care 
about protecting pro se litigants. A court with judges who care a lot about protecting pro 
se litigants may implement many pro se reforms and also have favorable case outcomes 
for pro se litigants because the judges are favorable to pro se litigants. Though it is difficult 
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One key possibility is that district courts that have implemented 
more pro se reforms may differ from other district courts in that 
they have dockets with more (or fewer) pro se litigants. However, 
previous analysis suggests that is not the case.104 Another poten-
tially important consideration is whether pro se reform is concen-
trated in a few district courts. But approximately 90 percent of 
district courts have implemented at least some services for 
nonprisoner pro se litigants, so this does not appear to be the case 
either.105 Finally, it could be the case that district courts typically 
implement either none or many of these reforms. However, simi-
lar numbers of district courts have implemented one, two, three, 
and four programs and procedures to assist pro se litigants;106 ac-
cordingly, there is no apparent all-or-nothing problem either.107 
While this Comment does not claim that these are all of the po-
tentially important omitted variables,108 it does seem that district 
court reform is a widespread practice used in different ways 
throughout those courts, suggesting that it is ripe for the type of 
analysis conducted here.109 
The potential relevance of selection bias in this analysis 
should also be addressed. As Part II discusses, selection bias can 
likely explain a portion of the gap in case outcomes between pro 
 
to rule out all omitted variables, in this case the widespread implementation of at least 
some reforms, coupled with the significant variation in which and how many are imple-
mented by each court, suggests this kind of omitted variable is unlikely. For more discus-
sion of omitted variable bias, see generally Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omit-
ted Variable Bias in Econometric Research, 22 Conflict Mgmt & Peace Sci 341 (2005). 
 104 See Stienstra, Bataillon, and Cantone, Assistance to Pro Se Litigants in U.S.  
District Courts at *3 (cited in note 11) (“[T]here appears to be no relationship between the 
number of services offered to pro se litigants and the average number of pro se filings in 
the district.”). 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id at *2. 
 107 Because almost all US district courts responded to the FJC Survey, there is no 
selection bias related to which district courts responded to the FJC Survey either. 
 108 For example, it could be the case that there is some correlation between the types 
of reforms implemented and the practices of the judges on the court. If one reform is par-
ticularly expensive or cumbersome, courts with judges that are favorably disposed toward 
pro se litigants may be more likely to implement it. 
 109 It is worth noting that these reforms could produce unobservable benefits in a 
number of ways. For example, as discussed previously, some district courts may be imple-
menting these reforms differently in practice, and it may be the case that a few are suc-
cessfully implementing the reforms, resulting in significant improvements to case out-
comes for those courts but not enough improvement to show up in the overall numbers. 
Alternately, it may be the case that one particular combination of reforms is especially 
impactful. There is not enough data to fruitfully study all permutations of reforms. Still, 
this analysis is revealing with respect to the cumulative effects of these reforms. 
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se and represented litigants.110 However, as this Part discusses, 
the relevant sample for comparison is the difference in case out-
comes between pro se litigants in courts that have implemented 
reforms and courts that have not implemented reforms. Thus, the 
pro se cases in different district courts are similarly affected by 
this selection bias. Litigants with weaker cases may be more 
likely to proceed pro se in EDNY, but they are also more likely to 
proceed pro se in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) or 
the Northern District of Illinois. Accordingly, the cases being com-
pared should presumably be similar in average strength, or at 
least there is no reason to think this selection bias will result in 
differences in average case strength for pro se litigants across dif-
ferent district courts. These selection bias issues result in a gap 
in the average strength of cases brought by pro se litigants and 
represented litigants, but they do not lead to a gap between the 
average strength of cases brought by pro se litigants in two dif-
ferent district courts.111 
C. Empirical Results 
In order to evaluate the effects of different pro se reform 
measures undertaken by district courts, this Section compares 
the win rates of pro se litigants in courts that have enacted each 
of the reforms discussed in the FJC Survey with the win rates of 
litigants in the districts that have not enacted those same re-
forms. Table 3A compares the win rates for plaintiffs in cases in 
which both parties are represented with those in which either the 
plaintiff or defendant is pro se based on whether the district court 
employs a particular policy. 
  
 
 110 See note 84 and accompanying text. 
 111 For a discussion of this and other selection bias issues related to the nonrandom 
assignment of which cases proceed pro se, see Greiner and Pattanayak, 121 Yale L J at 
2188–95 (cited in note 52). 
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TABLE 3A:  INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE 
POLICIES FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFFS, MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF WIN 
RATES, 2008–2010 
% of Cases Won by Plaint 

















 Yes No Yes No  
Programs and Procedures to Assist Pro Se Litigants 
Electronic filing through 
CM/ECF 
36 47% 46% 3% 3% 0% 
CM/ECF access to docket,  
pleadings, etc.  
34 47% 46% 3% 4% -1% 
Direct communication with  
pro se clerk 
24 45% 47% 3% 3% -1% 
Public info about pro se  
programs 
19 48% 46% 3% 3% -1% 
Mediation for pro se litigants 18 48% 46% 4% 3% 1% 
Other 14 49% 46% 4% 3% 1% 
Services to Help Pro Se Litigants Obtain Representation 
Bar-Maintained Pro Bono Panel 6 48% 46% 2% 3% -1% 
Listserv to Alert Bar of Need for 
Representation 
8 52% 46% 4% 3% 1% 
Court Pays Costs and Some  
Attorneys’ Fees 
20 44% 47% 3% 3% -1% 
Provision in Local Rules for  
Payment of Costs 
24 51% 44% 3% 3% 0% 
Handout about Low-Cost  
Legal Services 
33 45% 48% 3% 3% 0% 
Handout about Obtaining an  
Attorney 
32 46% 47% 4% 3% 0% 
Pro Bono Panel for Pro Se  
Litigants 
19 53% 44% 5% 3% 2% 
Local Rule Requiring Pro Bono 
Service from Bar 
13 53% 45% 5% 3% 2% 
Court Review to Determine  
Need for Counsel 
44 47% 46% 3% 4% -1% 
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Table 3A suggests that the various policies used to assist pro 
se litigants in federal district courts have not substantially af-
fected win rates for pro se plaintiffs. When both parties are rep-
resented, plaintiff win rates gravitate around 50 percent. When 
only the plaintiff is pro se, the plaintiff win rate hovers between 
2 and 5 percent. All of the policies registered in the FJC Survey 
classified as “programs and procedures to assist pro se liti-
gants”—the types of policies discussed throughout this  
Comment—appear to have no more than a 1 percent impact on 
the percent of pro se litigants that actually win cases in court. 
Perhaps more likely, they do not actually impact case outcomes 
at all, and the 1 percent variation is simply noise. Regardless of 
whether they account for some small improvement, however, 
these results show that pro se reforms are not significantly mov-
ing the needle in terms of case outcomes. Any potential improve-
ment is substantially smaller than what the experimental litera-
ture suggests would result from improved access to counsel.112 
Hence, compared to pro se win rates with a lawyer, these reforms 
cannot be considered a meaningful substitute for access to counsel 
even if they yield a small improvement, at least insofar as the goal 
is to help pro se litigants win more cases. 
In contrast, the results for services intended to help pro se 
litigants obtain representation are somewhat less clear. Again, 
the resultant “improvements” in win rates look more like statis-
tical noise than meaningful impacts, but there is arguably more 
room for contrary interpretations.113 However, while those re-
forms are no doubt also advocated by many seeking an alternative 
to civil Gideon, they concern increased access to counsel instead 
of substitutes for access to counsel. Thus, these kinds of reforms 
do not resemble the types of reforms suggested by the Supreme 
Court in Turner nor by most commentators discussing civil  
Gideon alternatives.114  
  
 
 112 See notes 52–59 and accompanying text for discussion of the experimental results. 
 113 But note that represented litigants in courts that have implemented these reforms 
also win cases 8 or 9 percent more frequently than they lose cases, so it’s plausible that 
the courts that have implemented those reforms are just more plaintiff-friendly (or typi-
cally handle cases that favor plaintiffs) or that these differences reflect more noise than 
signal. See Table 3A. 
 114 See text accompanying notes 41–45 and 66–67 for discussion of what Turner and 
commentators have called for. 
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TABLE 3B:  INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVENESS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE 
POLICIES, MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF WIN RATES, FOR PRO SE 
DEFENDANTS, 2008–2010 
% of Cases Won by Plaint 
 Both  
Rep’d 













 Yes No Yes No  
Programs and Procedures to Assist Pro Se Litigants 
Electronic filing through CM/ECF 36 47% 46% 82% 79% -3% 
CM/ECF access to docket,  
pleadings, etc.  
34 47% 46% 82% 79% -4% 
Direct communication with pro se 
clerk 
24 45% 47% 82% 80% -2% 
Public info about pro se programs 19 48% 46% 81% 80% -1% 
Mediation for pro se litigants 18 48% 46% 82% 80% -2% 
Other 14 49% 46% 82% 80% -2% 
Services to Help Pro Se Litigants Obtain Representation 
Bar-Maintained Pro Bono Panel 6 48% 46% 80% 80% 1% 
Listserv to Alert Bar of Need for 
Representation 
8 52% 46% 82% 80% -2% 
Court Pays Costs and Some  
Attorneys’ Fees 
20 44% 47% 80% 81% 1% 
Provision in Local Rules for  
Payment of Costs 
24 51% 44% 80% 81% 0% 
Handout about Low-Cost Legal  
Services 
33 45% 48% 81% 80% -1% 
Handout about Obtaining an  
Attorney 
32 46% 47% 81% 80% -1% 
Pro Bono Panel for Pro Se Litigants 19 53% 44% 80% 81% 1% 
Local Rule Requiring Pro Bono  
Service from Bar 
13 53% 45% 82% 80% -2% 
Court Review to Determine  
Need for Counsel 
44 47% 46% 82% 79% -2% 
 
Table 3B looks at the same questions for pro se defendants, 
and it tells the same story as Table 3A. Pro se defendants do not 
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reap any more benefits in terms of case outcomes from pro se re-
form than pro se plaintiffs. At least for the reforms considered in 
the FJC Survey, none seems individually effective. 
Table 3C relies on the same data but considers the win rates 
of different types of litigants based on the total number of policies 
that the district court has implemented rather than which partic-
ular policies the court has implemented. Table 3C thus seeks to 
test the slightly different hypothesis that there may be a cumula-
tive benefit from implementing these policies even if none is indi-
vidually impactful. 
TABLE 3C:  AGGREGATE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRO SE ASSISTANCE 
POLICIES, MEASURED BY PLAINTIFF WIN RATES 
Number of Pol-
icies Used by 
District Court 
% of Cases Won by Plaintiff 
 Both Rep’d Plaint Pro Se Def Pro Se 
Programs and Procedures to Assist Pro Se Litigants 
Zero Policies 43% 3% 76% 
One Policy  49% 4% 82% 
Two Policies 47% 4% 83% 
Three Policies 46% 3% 82% 
Four Policies 48% 3% 82% 
Five Policies 40% 2% 71% 
Services to Help Pro Se Litigants Obtain Representation 
Zero Policies 41% 2% 77% 
One Policy  46% 4% 79% 
Two Policies 41% 2% 82% 
Three Policies 51% 4% 83% 
Four Policies 52% 4% 81% 
Five Policies 45% 3% 77% 
Six Policies 54% 3% 81% 
Overall Average 
 46% 3% 80% 
 
Table 3C tells a similar story as Tables 3A and 3B. Although 
there is some variation in the win rates, there is no discernable 
pattern. Pro se litigants do not consistently have better case out-
comes in districts that have implemented more policies aimed at 
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improving the lot of pro se litigants. Instead, the win rates of pro 
se litigants deviate only a couple of percentage points from the 
overall average win rates for pro se litigants even in districts that 
have implemented three, four, or more of the policies considered 
in this Comment. 
Overall, the analysis in this Section suggests that, though 
many federal district courts have implemented reforms aimed at 
improving case outcomes for pro se litigants, they have not yet 
succeeded in improving those outcomes. Tables 3A and 3B sug-
gest that a variety of policies, each implemented in a substantial 
number of district courts, have all been ineffective in improving 
case outcomes for pro se litigants. Similarly, the evidence sug-
gests that even courts that have implemented multiple or many 
of these policies have not improved outcomes for pro se litigants 
thus far. Despite the belief expressed by clerks’ offices and chief 
judges of federal district courts, commentators, and the Supreme 
Court that these types of measures are effective, the empirical 
evidence suggests that these measures make no difference in case 
outcomes.115 
IV.  CASE STUDY: PRO SE REFORM IN EDNY 
This Part focuses on an extensive set of pro se reforms made 
in the federal district court in EDNY. Because these reforms were 
publicly announced around the time of their implementation, this 
Part conducts a difference-in-differences analysis of these reforms 
to complement the differences analysis from Part III.116 This 
analysis strengthens the results in Part III, suggesting that pro 
se reforms have not impacted case outcomes for pro se litigants. 
 
 115 At least insofar as these reforms are designed to substitute for additional access 
to counsel and help pro se litigants win more cases. As discussed previously, the fact that 
these reforms have not improved case outcomes does not imply that these reforms have 
not positively impacted other aspects of pro se litigation. 
 116 A difference-in-differences analysis is an analysis that looks at two samples (here, 
EDNY pro se litigant outcomes and non-EDNY pro se litigant outcomes) and compares the 
difference in the average result between those two groups before and after a treatment. 
This analysis compares the difference between EDNY and non-EDNY pro se litigant out-
comes before the pro se reform with the difference between EDNY and non-EDNY pro se 
litigant outcomes after the pro se reform. Non-EDNY in this analysis refers to all New 
York federal district courts other than EDNY: the Northern District of New York, SDNY, 
and Western District of New York. The treatment effect is the difference between these 
two differences—that is, the difference in differences. For more discussion of this method-
ology, see generally Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, How 
Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q J Econ 249 (2004). 
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A. Background on EDNY Pro Se Reform 
In May 2001, EDNY began one of the country’s more dra-
matic pro se reform programs, elevating a magistrate judge to a 
newly created pro se office focused entirely on overseeing pro se 
litigation and assigning her broad responsibilities for overseeing 
pro se litigation.117 These reforms were implemented with the in-
tent to help “facilitate access to the courts” for pro se litigants.118 
The EDNY pro se office has two primary functions.119 First, 
the magistrate judge’s pro se office—comprised of staff attorneys 
and administrative office employees—proposes initial orders to 
the assigned judge, including to dismiss or to direct the litigant to 
amend the complaint, and responds to inquiries from the judge’s 
offices about the cases. As part of these initial duties, the office 
gives procedural advice to individuals about filing and litigating 
their claims by answering questions and making forms and in-
structions available. Second, the magistrate judge automatically 
oversees all pro se cases that survive screening, handles pretrial 
matters, and presides at trial with the parties’ consent.120 These 
reforms do not exactly mimic those discussed in the FJC Survey 
and evaluated in the empirical analysis above. However, they do 
include a number of efforts similar to those evaluated in  
Table 3B—providing forms and handbooks as well as individual 
case assistance, for instance. Because this reform effort is differ-
ent from those that Part III discusses, it’s hard to directly com-
pare them. But both sets of reforms fit into a similar broad bucket: 
attempts by courts to improve the pro se litigation process by fa-
cilitating simpler and more convenient interactions between pro 
se litigants and the courts. 
Although EDNY created this office partially in response to the 
growth of pro se litigation in that district, its caseload appears 
broadly representative of pro se litigation more generally as of 
1999, shortly before the creation of the magistrate judge’s office.121 
 
 117 Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 476–77 (cited in 
note 74). 
 118 Id at 477. 
 119 See id at 496–97 (discussing in more detail how pro se litigation is handled in EDNY). 
 120 Id at 496. The only exceptions to the practice of sending all screened pro se cases 
to the magistrate judge are for Social Security appeals and federal prisoner petitions seek-
ing habeas corpus relief. Id. 
 121 See Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 493–94 (cited 
in note 74). About 15 percent of civil cases were pro se cases in 1999, and a substantial 
percentage of those cases were prisoner pro se cases, so the percent of the docket comprised 
of nonprisoner pro se cases was relatively close to the typical 9 percent of the federal docket 
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The concerns that led to EDNY’s decision to appoint this special 
magistrate judge—the difficulty of fairly and efficiently managing 
the large pro se docket and the need for specialized resources to do 
so—seem to echo the same primary concerns that other courts and 
commentators have expressed about the pro se litigation process.122 
To date, a public, empirical assessment of the effects of this 
office on outcomes of pro se litigation is not available. This Part 
seeks to begin to fill that gap by evaluating the impact of EDNY’s 
reforms on the pro se process. Part IV.B discusses the methodol-
ogy for this analysis. Part IV.C finds that the reforms in the 
EDNY have had a small, and in fact negative, impact on the win 
rates of pro se litigants in that court.123 This evidence, when com-
bined with the evidence in Part III, strengthens this Comment’s 
finding that pro se reforms in trial courts have been ineffectual at 
improving litigation outcomes for pro se litigants. 
It is important to note that the reforms EDNY implemented 
in 2001 were intended as a first step in an effort toward improving 
the process of pro se litigation. Moreover, the office has had more 
than ten years to continue innovating and revising its policy and 
procedures, but none of those efforts would show up in this  
analysis.124 The analysis below attempts only to assess the impact 
of the creation of the pro se office over its first five years of exist-
ence. Specific information about subsequent reforms imple-
mented by the office is not readily available and hence not ripe 
for analysis. However, any such reforms may have had a different 
 
for the time period that Table 2A covers. Further, the bulk of those cases were civil rights 
cases, employment discrimination cases, and Social Security cases. The former two cate-
gories are also the most typical types of nonprisoner pro se litigation in this analysis, as 
Table 2D shows. 
 122 Id at 495. 
 123 Note that this does not necessarily imply the pro se reforms in EDNY are failing 
to improve the litigation process for pro se litigants. See notes 97–100 and accompanying 
text. It is conceivable that, for example, the reforms in EDNY have led to higher average 
settlement values for pro se plaintiffs and thus improved overall outcomes for pro se liti-
gants. Moreover, there could be important benefits to a litigation process in which pro se 
litigants feel more fully heard and in which the process is more dignified for pro se liti-
gants. This office could be creating large benefits for pro se litigants in EDNY overall. 
However, this analysis is restricted to case outcomes. Further, the pro se reforms in EDNY 
may be making a positive impact in terms of the efficiency side of the equation, helping to 
dispose of pro se cases more quickly and efficiently than would otherwise be the case and 
reducing the overall burden of pro se cases on the court despite not improving case out-
comes for pro se litigants. 
 124 In 2002, Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom of the pro se office cowrote an article mak-
ing it clear that the office was intended as an imperfect step toward addressing the prob-
lem with the intention of adapting the institution over time. See Bloom and Hershkoff, 16 
Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 517 (cited in note 74). 
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impact on case outcomes for pro se litigants and, accordingly, may 
indicate more promising future directions for pro se reform. 
B. Methodology 
In order to evaluate the impact of EDNY’s pro se reforms, this 
Comment runs a logistic regression using whether the plaintiff 
won the case as the independent variable. The dataset for this 
regression is all cases decided in the four New York district courts 
between 1998 and 2007 that involved pro se plaintiffs and repre-
sented defendants. This dataset includes 578 cases from the 
Northern District of New York (NDNY), 2,658 cases from EDNY, 
3,843 cases from SDNY, and 668 cases from the Western District 
of New York (WDNY). The key variable of interest is a binary var-
iable that is coded “1” if the case is in EDNY and filed after the 
implementation of the pro se reforms and “0” otherwise.125 There 
were 1,408 cases in this dataset from after EDNY implemented 
the reforms. 
There are a few potential omitted variables that this analysis 
is unable to capture. One possible issue is changing caseloads in 
each district over time. If the composition of EDNY’s pro se docket 
shifted in a different way than New York’s other district courts in 
the years surrounding the reform, that may hide the impact of 
EDNY’s reforms. Another possibility is that noncourt legal actors 
may have changed their strategies in response to EDNY reforms. 
If, for example, outside legal aid clinics started shifting their re-
sources to non-EDNY courts in response to this reform, possibly 
because those clinics knew that pro se litigants would receive ad-
equate assistance in EDNY due to the reforms, that may also 
mask the impact of these reforms in EDNY. Finally, because this 
analysis compares the outcomes of pro se litigation in EDNY with 
outcomes of pro se litigation in the other New York district courts, 
if those district courts also made improvements to the pro se liti-
gation process during this time period, the analysis might under-
state the effect of the EDNY reforms. 
The regression is run with five different sets of specifications. 
The first regresses outcomes against a dummy for whether the 
 
 125 Although the reform was implemented in May 2001, this Comment codes this var-
iable to 1 only for all cases filed in 2002 and after. The theoretical reason for this is to give 
the reform the benefit of the doubt; it may have had an effect, but that effect may appear 
only after it was integrated into EDNY’s normal pro se proceedings. In practice, the re-
gression results do not meaningfully change if this variable is set to “1” for all cases filed 
in May 2001 and after. 
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case took place with EDNY reform; the second model adds a 
dummy variable indicating whether each case took place in 
EDNY; the third model adds dummy variables indicating which 
district court each case was filed in; the fourth adds dummy var-
iables for the year the case was filed (but removes the district 
dummy variables); and the fifth model includes dummy variables 
for both the year and district for each case.126 
By selecting the time period from 1998 to 2007, this dataset 
includes a symmetrical five years of cases from prior to the 
implementation of the reform (1998–2002) and five years 
afterward (2003–2007). Although the specific choice of five years 
is arbitrary, the essential results are robust to the length of time 
analyzed.127 
C. Empirical Results 
From an initial look at Figure 1, no meaningful change in the 
outcomes of pro se litigation in EDNY appears in the years fol-
lowing the creation of the pro se magistrate’s office. Instead, for 
all district courts in the New York area, there is seemingly con-
siderable variance in case outcomes on a yearly basis, with pro se 
litigants performing very similarly on average in both sets of dis-
tricts before and after the pro se reform. However, Figure 1 does 
reflect the possibility that the percent of cases won by pro se 
plaintiffs in the other New York district courts trended downward 
more than in EDNY. But this is uncertain. With the exception of 
1999, the win rates of pro se litigants are relatively similar in 
EDNY to New York’s other district courts. 
 
 126 A dummy variable is a variable that takes a value of either 0 or 1 to indicate 
whether data falls within a certain category.  This enables regressions to capture the im-
pact of non-numeric qualitative data. 
 127 The estimated coefficients have the same signs and similar magnitudes, and 95 
percent confidence intervals similarly exclude the possibility of a statistically significant 
positive impact if a period of three or four years is considered instead of a five-year period. 
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FIGURE 1:  PERCENT OF CASES WON BY PRO SE PLAINTIFFS, 
EDNY VERSUS NON-EDNY DISTRICT COURTS IN NY, 1998–2007 
 
From Figure 1, it’s difficult to tell whether there is a trend in 
EDNY meaningfully different from the trend seen in other New 
York district courts. To investigate this further, this Comment 
runs the logistic regression described above. Table 4 displays the 
results of that regression. Because the outcome variable is 
whether a plaintiff wins or loses a particular case, and each of the 
independent variables in this regression is a binary dummy vari-
able, the coefficients describe the change in the probability of a 
case outcome when the variable is set to 1 instead of 0. Hence, a 
coefficient of 0.5 on the variable “EDNY Reform Dummy” would 
imply that EDNY Reform increased the chances of a pro se plain-
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TABLE 4:  IMPACT OF EDNY PRO SE REFORMS ON PRO SE 
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7,747 7,747 7,747 7,747 7,747 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Table 4 suggests that, like the other pro se reforms that 
Part III considers, the pro se reforms in EDNY have not been ef-
fective in improving case outcomes for pro se litigants. The coeffi-
cient on the dummy variable indicating whether the EDNY pro 
se reforms were instituted is -0.59, and the 95 percent confidence 
interval suggests that there is some nonzero negative effect when 
no controls are instituted in the first model in column one.128 The 
results are similar for the second and third models except that, 
 
 128 However, this result is not robust against a different choice of years. For example, 
while the point estimate is still negative, the 95 percent confidence interval for a regres-
sion run on data from 1999 through 2006 includes zero (though the 90 percent confidence 
interval does not). Thus, the better takeaway at this point is not that the reform has had 
a negative impact on win rates but that it has not had a significant positive impact on win 
rates. 
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once all districts are controlled for, the negative impact of the re-
form is statistically significant. When dummies are introduced 
corresponding to the year of each case filing, this negative effect 
disappears and the fourth and fifth models indicate no statisti-
cally significant impact from the reform. Including the full set of 
controls for year and district, the 95 percent confidence interval 
suggests that the reforms in EDNY had an impact of somewhere 
between -0.43 percent and 0.51 percent on the win rates for pro 
se litigants, with a statistically insignificant mean estimated im-
pact of 0.04 percent.129 These results suggest that pro se reforms 
were not effective at improving win rates for pro se litigants. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical findings in Parts II, III, and IV have a number 
of potentially important implications for the future of pro se liti-
gation. However, before considering the policy implications, this 
Comment must reiterate the limits of this analysis. First, this 
analysis centers only on case outcomes. Further analysis—for ex-
ample, a survey-based analysis that asks litigants how they feel 
after they went through the litigation process—may reveal sub-
stantial benefits stemming from pro se reforms that this study 
does not find. Second, this analysis shows only that the reforms 
highlighted throughout this analysis have not impacted case out-
comes for nonprisoner pro se litigants on average across courts. 
However, it might be the case that certain courts have been much 
more successful in implementing these reforms than others, and 
this analysis masks those successes. Moreover, limitations on sur-
vey data, coupled with the fact that litigation frequently takes 
years to resolve, mean that most of the data analyzed in this  
Comment is five to ten years old. Courts may have developed 
more promising innovations in the meantime, but this type of 
analysis would not be able to detect those benefits until most or 
all of the litigation begun in those years has run its course. Addi-
tionally, it’s possible that some of these reforms are significantly 
impacting case outcomes for prisoner pro se litigants, which may 
separately be an important goal of these reforms. 
 
 129 Running a linear, rather than logistic, regression—which may be more familiar to 
some readers—with the same specifications, the confidence interval for the estimated im-
pact of EDNY reform is from -0.05 to 0.06, with a statistically insignificant mean estimated 
impact of 0.003 percent. 
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One important takeaway from this Comment, related to the 
limitations described above, is the importance of additional stud-
ies into the effectiveness of other reform measures, especially re-
form measures undertaken in courts other than federal district 
courts. As previously mentioned, other courts throughout the 
country have experimented with ways to help pro se litigants.130 
Although the particular reforms analyzed here appear to have 
been ineffective, other reforms undertaken by other courts might 
achieve better results. With sufficient empirical legwork, success-
ful reforms can be identified, and other courts can learn from 
those successes. Although courts likely attempt to learn from each 
other’s practices, without empirical validation of these tech-
niques, there’s a risk that the blind are leading the blind. More 
empirical studies could help show the way. 
Additional studies that help determine the extent to which 
differences in access to counsel are responsible for the gaps in case 
outcomes between pro se and represented litigants, especially 
across a broader range of types of cases, would also be useful. If 
differences in access to counsel explain differences in case out-
comes, the legal community should be more fearful that those 
without adequate resources are being deprived of meaningful ac-
cess to the legal system. Moreover, if communities that lack the 
means to gain access to counsel lack effective legal recourse, de-
spite sometimes having meritorious claims, then the legal com-
munity should also worry that bad actors can gain by depriving 
those communities of legal rights without facing the deterrent ef-
fects of litigation. Concerns about exploitative employers may be 
heightened if more than 2 percent of pro se plaintiffs have fully 
meritorious claims but only 2 percent of those plaintiffs can effec-
tively seek relief due to difficulties navigating the legal system. 
Conversely, if lack of access to counsel does not explain poor case 
outcomes for pro se litigants, perhaps the legal community should 
focus on other considerations, such as making pro se litigants feel 
that they have received a fair chance in court and had their griev-
ances heard, rather than trying to narrow the gaps in case out-
comes or provide lawyers for more pro se litigants. 
Acknowledging the limits described above, this Comment 
does find that pro se reform in federal district courts has not yet 
meaningfully impacted case outcomes for pro se litigants, 
whereas increased access to counsel has had somewhat more 
 
 130 See note 65. 
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promising results in the experimental literature.131 The policy im-
plications of those facts are not immediately clear. These results 
suggest that increased access to counsel may help pro se litigants 
vindicate rights; however, the wisdom of that approach depends 
on whether the costs of that increased access to counsel outweigh 
the benefits or whether there are cheaper ways to achieve those 
benefits. One critical question in this vein is whether there are 
more effective reform opportunities available to courts, because 
more effective reforms could still conceivably enable improved 
outcomes for pro se litigants at a lower cost than increased access 
to counsel. This Comment finds little evidence that measures 
thus far implemented by courts have improved case outcomes. 
Hence, merely renewing and expanding similar reforms does not 
appear to be an especially promising path forward. 
One more effective path might look toward a growing body of 
research on more effective ways to provide self-help resources and 
literature to pro se litigants. A recent article by Professors 
Greiner, Dalié Jiménez, and Lois R. Lupica details their endeav-
ors to develop a theory of the issues that potential pro se civil lit-
igants would face in the legal process. Their article then draws on 
recent developments in a number of fields, such as education, psy-
chology, and public health, to imagine what truly effective self-
help materials would look like and how they might help pro se 
litigants fare better at trial.132 Courts and commentators could try 
to enhance the effectiveness of their reform efforts by drawing on 
this and other similar research. Using this kind of research to 
provide effective educational handbooks or to help courts com-
municate in ways that are more useful to pro se litigants could 
enhance the types of pro se reforms analyzed in this Comment. 
Finally, one other potential policy implication suggested by 
this Comment is that expanded access to counsel for certain pro 
se litigants may be an attractive option. This Comment does not 
fully analyze the potential costs or benefits of civil Gideon and 
 
131 See text accompanying notes 52–59. 
 132 See generally D. James Greiner, Dalié Jiménez, and Lois R. Lupica, Self-Help, 
Reimagined, 92 Ind L J 1119 (2017). It is difficult to synthesize their conclusions into a 
simple path toward providing pro se litigants with effective assistance, but they emphasize 
in particular the need for breaking legal problems down into their constituent components, 
including mental, psychological, and cognitive issues, as well as identifying and imple-
menting relevant research from nonlegal literature to address those problems. They em-
phasize in particular that often the “relevant tasks have little to do with formal law.” Id 
at 1172. 
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accordingly comes to no conclusion about its overall merits.133 
However, many commentators have opposed civil Gideon par-
tially on the grounds that pro se reforms at the trial court level 
could be a cheaper, but still effective, alternative.134 The Supreme 
Court has suggested a similar belief.135 But while not totally con-
clusive for the reasons described above, this Comment indicates 
that those reforms have not had the kind of impact on case out-
comes that increased access to counsel might have. Because these 
reforms do not yet appear to be a viable and effective alternative 
to civil Gideon, this Comment suggests that improved case out-
comes may be better achieved through expanded access to counsel 
than through pro se reforms. 
CONCLUSION 
The challenges presented by the large volume of pro se cases 
in federal district courts may require meaningful changes to 
achieve a full resolution. In order to make headway on that front, 
reformers must properly contextualize and understand the na-
ture of pro se litigation in those courts and evaluate the successes 
and failures of efforts that have been undertaken thus far. 
This Comment presents commentators with a perspective on 
the volume, types, and typical success rates of pro se litigants in 
federal district courts. It shows that nonprisoner pro se litigants 
comprise a meaningful percentage of the federal docket. 
Moreover, pro se litigants show up in substantial numbers across 
many different types of litigation, from property cases, to torts 
cases, to civil rights cases. However, in nearly all of those types of 
cases, pro se litigants fare at least several times worse than 
represented litigants; overall, pro se plaintiffs are less than one-
tenth as likely to win cases as represented plaintiffs, whereas pro 
se defendants are only about one-third as likely to win cases as 
represented defendants. 
 
 133 For example, this Comment does not consider how many resources would be re-
quired to enact civil Gideon nor whether they could be better used elsewhere. It also does 
not consider whether civil Gideon itself would be effective at improving civil pro se out-
comes. While the experimental literature discussed earlier suggests that access to counsel 
improves case outcomes for pro se litigants, it is unclear whether a similar quality of coun-
sel would be provided in a civil Gideon world. Indeed, the success of Gideon in the criminal 
context is a hotly debated subject, with many scholars considering it a disappointment. 
For an example of a scholar who considers Gideon a disappointment, see generally Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 Yale L J 2676 (2013). 
 134 See Part I.B. 
 135 See Turner, 564 US at 447–48. 
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Moreover, this Comment assesses the effects of reforms in 
federal district courts aimed at helping pro se litigants. It sug-
gests that, despite widespread optimism from numerous stake-
holders in the American legal community, reforms to federal dis-
trict courts intended to improve the pro se litigation process have 
thus far had a negligible impact on the outcomes of pro se litiga-
tion. If the goal is to improve case outcomes for pro se litigants, or 
to replace the potential positive impact of increased access to 
counsel at a lower cost, the types of reforms undertaken thus far 
appear to have been unsuccessful. 
APPENDIX:  AO DATA PROCESSING 
The AO dataset is created and made available through the 
Federal Judicial Center.136 This Comment’s processing of the AO 
dataset closely mirrors the processing implemented in other legal 
scholarship.137 The dataset used in this analysis includes cases 
terminated between June 1988 and June 2017 as well as pending 
cases. 
To process this dataset, first I eliminated all cases filed before 
January 1, 1998; the analysis in this Comment considers only 
cases filed after that date. After that, I dropped the following sets 
of cases: all cases from non-Article III district courts; all cases 
with a “local question” as the nature of the suit; all cases that are 
currently still pending and lack a termination date; all cases that 
have missing values for the case disposition; all observations that 
have missing values for the nature of the suit; a variety of cases 
that have a nature of suit variable indicating that the suits are of 
a peculiar or inconsequential variety;138 certain categories of suits 
that have the government as a party;139 and cases that are 
 
 136 See Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending from SY 1988 to Present (Federal 
Judicial Center, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Y4CY-MVG5. Note that the data is not 
available for download from the Perma link. For the most recent data, see Civil Cases 
Filed, Terminated, and Pending from SY 1988 to Present (Federal Judicial Center, 2018), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/research/idb/civil-cases-filed-terminated-and-pending- 
sy-1988-present (visited June 3, 2018). Note that the data used in this analysis was down-
loaded on October 3, 2017, and the data available through this link may have changed 
since that date. 
 137 See, for example, William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Stand-
ards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J Legal Stud 35, 61–63 (2013). 
 138 Case types 400, 520, 750, 810, 862, and 900. See Integrated Data Base Civil Docu-
mentation (cited in note 77). Note that several of these no longer are used. Code 900, for 
example, pertains to appeals of (typically minor) court fees. 
 139 Case types 150, 151, 152, and 153 include, for example, suits brought by the gov-
ernment for recovery on defaulted student loans or reimbursements of overpayments by 
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typically filed by prisoners and are considered “prisoner pro se 
litigation.”140 
In addition to dropping the above cases, I undertook a series 
of steps to consolidate multiple records from certain cases and 
prevent those cases from being double-counted. To do so, I first 
created unique identifiers for each case based on the district, of-
fice, and docket number of its first filing. I then used those unique 
identifiers to consolidate multiple records that correspond to the 
same case into single records. I considered the filing date to be 
the first date on which the case was filed and the termination date 
to be the final date on which the case was terminated. 
The AO dataset was created for administrative purposes ra-
ther than research, and the reliability of some of the fields kept 
in the dataset can be uncertain, as shown in a 2003 study of the 
AO dataset.141 However, this 2003 empirical analysis of the AO 
dataset suggests that win rates, the key outcome variable used in 
this analysis, can be deduced reliably from the AO dataset.142 That 
2003 study concludes that when “judgment is entered for plaintiff 
or defendant (at least in cases coded with nonzero-awards) the 
reported victor is overwhelmingly accurate” and thus that analy-
sis based on win rates in the AO dataset is appropriate.143 
 
the government of veteran benefits or Medicare payments. See id. These types of cases 
typically result in default. 
 140 The cases that are considered “prisoner pro se litigation” are those with a value of 
510, 530, 535, 540, 550, and 555 in the nature of suit field, all of which are labeled as either 
a type of “prisoner petition” or a habeas petition from someone facing the death penalty. 
See id. 
 141 For a fuller discussion of the AO dataset’s reliability, see generally Theodore  
Eisenberg and Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 Notre Dame L Rev 1455 (2003). 
 142 See id at 1489. 
 143 Id. 
